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A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTIONS AND BANKRUPTCY IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
MARC BERNSTEIN*
Environmental law, like all other fields of law, does not operate in
a vacuum. Everything from common law contract principles to
constitutional issues can arise in the context of an environmental claim.
The attorney in the environmental area needs to keep abreast of the
influential principles from other areas of practice in order to counsel
clients fully and properly.
A fine example of this commingling of specialties concerns the
federal Bankruptcy Code' and state environmental laws. Clashes between
these two areas arise frequently. For instance, a party seeking protection
under the Bankruptcy Code may possess environmentally tainted property.
The debtor will wish to rid the estate of this unprofitable property, which
he may do under the Code's abandonment provision.2 Yet, a state agency
may oppose this decision by the debtor. The environmental agency,
saddled with the task of protecting both human health and the health and
beauty of the environment, will pursue the debtor. The agency will seek
to pierce the protective barrier of the Bankruptcy Code and hold the debtor
to his statutory obligation under state law to remediate the site.3 This
simple scenario illustrates the inherent conflict between the principles
underlying bankruptcy law and the goals of environmental legislation.
State environmental laws and the Bankruptcy Code make little
provision for the operation of one another.4 Courts must resolve the
conflict between the two. To the dismay of attorneys practicing in the
* B.S. in Psychology and Religion, Duke University, 1989; J.D. Marshall-Wythe School
of Law, College of William and Mary, expected 1994.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1992).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1992).
3. This hypothetical situation occurs quite frequently and underlies a substantial volume
of case law which addresses the struggle between bankruptcy protection and
environmental compliance. See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envt'l
Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); In re Smith-
Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Shore Co., Inc., 134 B.R. 572 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1991).
4. See In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 167 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) ("The Bankruptcy
Code does not expressly mention environmental cleanup obligations and provides no
special guidance as to how they should be treated in bankruptcy.").
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Fourth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
has said little on these issues.5 In order to analyze disputes of this nature,
lawyers must look elsewhere for guidance.
This Article will synthesize controlling case law with influential
decisions from other circuits in order to present a coherent, comprehensive
overview of the resolution of issues such as the hypothetical situation
outlined above. The discussion will center on enforcement actions of state
environmental agencies and how these actions are affected when a party
holding title to tainted property declares bankruptcy. The Article dissects
the problem by analyzing the agency's case against the various entities that
the agency may pursue, i.e., the debtor, the trustee and the estate.6 A
brief, generally applicable discussion follows regarding the state agencies'
imposition of penalties.
This Article will illustrate that the law of the Fourth Circuit is by
no means clear on these issues. The limited treatment that these matters
have received has arguably created more questions than it has resolved.
Therefore, attorneys must analyze carefully each future case which
juxtaposes the Bankruptcy Code with state environmental laws in order to
understand fully the current state of law in the Fourth Circuit.
5. The only decision by this court directly regarding the tensions between state
environmental statutes and the Bankruptcy Code is In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d
12 (4th Cir. 1988).
6. This Article will not discuss the liability of creditors of the debtor. For an
introduction to the unsettled issue of lender liability, see generally United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (suggesting that a secured creditor may be
liable if it participated in management "to a degree indicating capacity to influence the
corporation's treatment of hazardous waste"); National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan: Lender Liability Under CERCLA, 57 Fed. Reg. 18, 344
(1992) (issuing EPA final rule regarding lender liability under CERCLA); James P.
O'Brien & Jeremy A. Gibson, Final EPA Rule Allows Traditional Lender Activities
Without Superfund Liabilities, 23 Current Developments, Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2 at 326
(May 15, 1992) (discussing developments in Congress and EPA in the wake of expansive
liability rule of Fleet Factors and outlining new EPA rule designed to restore lender's
traditional role).
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I. AcTIoNS INVOLVING THE DEBTOR7
The debtor cannot escape liability under compliance agreements
into which the debtor entered prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.8  Furthermore, where a pre-petition agreement exists, the
automatic stay9 will not provide temporary relief for the debtor."0 The
automatic stay only prevents the state from enforcing monetary
judgments." The stay permits the state to secure injunctive relief when
such relief is in furtherance of a state's regulatory or police powers.12
Environmental regulation clearly falls under this exception. 3
The debtor may argue that injunctive relief which requires
expenditure of money from the estate essentially enforces a money
judgment. This argument will invariably fail. The Third Circuit was the
first to reject this contention. In Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Resources,4 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit allowed an injunction to issue requiring the debtor to abide
by a pre-petition agreement to bring the debtor's mining operation into
compliance with state law.'5 The court rested on two propositions to
7. This discussion covers only debtors who no longer possess the bankruptcy estate.
Courts treat debtors in possession in much the same way that they treat trustees. See 28
U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1992) (Subject to certain limitations, "a debtor in possession shall have
all the rights ... and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties ... of a
[Chapter Eleven] trustee."); see also Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963);
RICHARD I. AARON, BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 10.01 [2], at 10-5 (1992) ("The
debtor in possession ... wear[s] the hat of the trustee .... ). Therefore, debtors in
possession will be examined along with Chapter Eleven Trustees in a later discussion.
See infra notes 68 through 77 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Envt'l Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1984). But see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (duties under pre-petition clean-
up order become dischargeable if state has appointed a receiver to carry out such duties)
(discussed more fully infra pp. 6-7 and 16).
9. The automatic stay is an essential element of the bankruptcy process. The stay
temporarily relieves the debtor from collection efforts in order to afford the debtor time
to devise a repayment or reorganization plan. See generally H. Rept. No. 95-595 to
accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), at 340-44 (explaining the basic
provisions of the automatic stay) and 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1992).
10. E.g., Penn Terra, Ltd., 733 F.2d at 267.
11. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1992).
12. Id.
13. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272.
14. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 279.
19921
46 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 17:43
distinguish the injunction from a money judgment. First, the injunction
was prospective and therefore did not represent a presently liquidated
sum. 16 Second, the injunction focused on future compliance and not past
damages.'
7
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Kovacs,'
while not directly on point, lends support to the Penn Terra logic. In
Kovacs, the petitioner, State of Ohio, had secured an injunction in state
court to compel respondent to clean up his corporation's hazardous waste
disposal site.' 9 When respondent failed to comply with the court order,
Ohio appointed a receiver to administer the clean-up activities.2 °
Subsequent to the appointment of the receiver, respondent filed for
protection under Chapter Seven.2'
The United States Supreme Court held that the respondent's
obligation under the injunction was a debt under the Bankruptcy Code and
so was dischargeable. 22 The Court noted that the state could have elected
not to seek the appointment of a receiver and simply have prosecuted
respondent under the applicable environmental laws or in a civil or
criminal contempt proceeding.23 Through the appointment of a receiver,
the state effectively reduced a potentially enforceable injunction to a mere
pecuniary disbursement.2 In distinguishing Penn Terra, the Court
implicitly recognized that situations exist in which the state's enforcement
action will be excepted from the automatic stay.' "The automatic stay
provision does not apply to suits to enforce the regulatory statutes of the
State, but enforcement of such a judgment by seeking money from the
bankrupt... is another matter."26 In this way, the Court tacitly approved
of Penn Terra's determination that direct enforcement of a pre-petition
agreement is acceptable under the automatic stay.
Penn Terra and Kovacs make clear the notion that the state may
only compel the debtor to act directly to effect the clean-up. Once the
16. Id. at 275-76.
17. Id. at 276-77.
18. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
19. Id. at 276.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 278-83.
23. Id. at 282.
24. Id. at 282-83.
25. Id. at 283-84 n.11.
26. Id.
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debtor's action involves the up-front payment of money to the state, the
automatic stay likely provides protection from the state agency's
enforcement mechanismsY
II. ACTIONS INVOLVING THE TRUSTEE
A. The Midlantic Rule in the Fourth Circuit
The rules pertaining to the liabilities and obligations of bankruptcy
trustees with regard to environmental remediation stem mainly from a
Supreme Court holding concerning abandonment of environmentally
tainted property.28 In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection,29 the Court limited the trustee's power to
abandon burdensome property to situations in which the property in
question is not "in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified
hazards."3 However, the now famous footnote nine provides:
This exception to the abandonment power vested in the
trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a
speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws
that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment power
27. The Court noted in Kovacs that the appointment of a receiver may have been a wise
course of action for the state to take in order to effectuate a clean-up. Id. at 283.
Unfortunately, the state's strategy backfired precisely because the respondent declared
bankruptcy. The result in Kovacs thus requires states that are considering dispossessing
a -responsible party of its assets to carefully scrutinize the party's finances before
commencing any action.
In the event that a receiver has been appointed, the claim which the state has in
the bankruptcy proceeding for the cost of the clean-up becomes dischargeable. Id. at 278-
83. In cases where bankruptcy is imminent or likely, the state's best approach is to stand
on its injunction. Conversely, the responsible party can seek the appointment of a
receiver and then have the action stayed and the debt discharged.
Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring opinion that the state can set the
relative priority of its claim as against other creditors by statute. Id. at 286 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Thus, the state may elect to raise its claims to the level of a statutory lien
or secured claim in order to protect its interest. Id.
28. See In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 946 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
29. 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (5-4 decision), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).
30. Id. at 507. In general, the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee to "abandon any
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value
and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1992).
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is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably
calculated to protect the public health or safety from
imminent and identifiable harm.3"
Two basic camps have developed in the interpretation of footnote
nine.32 The narrow constructionists seize on the fact that the footnote is
an exception to the generally permissive abandonment rule. Such courts
require merely that the site at issue not be an imminent and identifiable
threat to human health.33 The broad view gives more weight to the text
of the Midlantic opinion than to the footnote. This camp demands that the
site be remediated to comply with all applicable state environmental laws
before the court will permit abandonment by the trustee. 4
The Fourth Circuit takes the narrow view in its interpretation of the
Midlantic exception.35 Only in cases where an imminent and identifiable
harm threatens the public health or safety will the court restrict the
abandonment power.1
6
31. Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 507 n.9.
32. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 15 (4th Cir. 1988). The difficulty involved
in counselling clients becomes painfully apparent when one considers that not even the
courts themselves are sure which jurisdictions ascribe to which interpretation of Midlantic.
Compare In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168 n.24 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989), (holding
that Fourth Circuit takes the position that Midlantic requires full compliance with
environmental laws), with In re Shore Co., Inc., 134 B.R. 572, 576-77 (Bankr. E.D. Tex.
1991) (holding that Fourth circuit will permit abandonment under Midlantic absent
demonstration of imminent harm).
33. See, e.g., In re Franklin Signal Corp., 65 B.R. 268, 271 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
34. E.g., In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943, 946-47 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987).
This stringent demand is usually tempered by certain qualifications. For example, the
court in Peerless Plating required that (1) the law in question was not so onerous as to
interfere with the bankruptcy adjudication itself; (2) the law in question was reasonably
designed to protect the public health; and (3) the violation caused by the abandonment
was not speculative. Id. at 947. See also In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 169 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1989) (requiring further that the trustee have the financial resources to ensure
the success of the remediation).
35. Smith-Douglass, 856 F.2d at 16.
36. Id. at 17. Although Smith-Douglass concerned a Chapter Eleven filing, the holding
clearly will apply to Chapter Seven trustees as well. First, the debtor in Smith-Douglass
had admitted that reorganization was impossible and had begun to liquidate the estate,
making the concerns of the court nearly identical to those of a Chapter Seven case. Id.
at 13-14. Second, a recent ruling in a Fourth Circuit bankruptcy court on abandonment
by Chapter Seven trustees cited Smith-Douglass with approval. See In re Doyle Lumber,
Inc., 137 B.R. 197, 201-2 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
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Two bankruptcy court decisions within the Fourth Circuit provide
a factual framework of the abandonment power under Midlantic. In In re
Doyle Lumber, Inc.,37 the debtor had ceased operations at its saw mill and
wood treating facility." The trustee then failed to implement the proper
closure procedures, including removal of hazardous wastes and soil
sampling?9 A bankruptcy court in the Western District of Virginia
authorized abandonment because the violation did not occur through
mishandling or misuse of toxic substances and therefore created no threat
of public harm.40
Conversely, the debtor in In re FCX, Inc." did not receive
unfettered license to abandon the estate's tainted property.42 The court
determined that the public health need not be actually impacted adversely
before the court may curtail abandonment.43  The "imminent and
identifiable harm" standard demands only that a "present and real
possibility of public exposure" to the hazard on the debtor's property
exists."4 In FCX the court deemed five tons of pesticides buried in an
uncontrolled condition to be such an imminent and identifiable danger.4
The court found that the environmental hazard could manifest itself as a
present danger at any time and was therefore an imminent threat.46 The
fact that the danger might not have been realized until five years later did
37. 137 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992).
38. Id. at 199-200.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 202-03.
41. 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989). The basis of the FCX decision was a federal
statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1992). The court noted that in an abandonment proceeding, the
critical determination, whether there is an imminent and identifiable harm, in no way
relates to the source of the law being violated. FCX, 96 B.R. at 54-55. Courts, therefore,
should draw no distinction between violations of state and federal environmental laws
when assessing the permissibility of an abandonment. Id. See also In re Peerless Plating
Co., 70 B.R. 943,947 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987) ("The EPA's administrative decision as
to [whether] imminent harm [exists] is relevant but far from controlling."). But see In re
Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
42. In re FCX, Inc., 96 B.R. at 54. The court required that the debtor set aside $250,000,
the estimated cost of eradicating the imminent threat to the public, before the court would
permit abandonment. Id.
43. Id. at 55.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 54.
46. Id. at 55.
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not diminish the present threat.47
Doyle Lumber and FCX demonstrate that the courts will look
beyond the debtor's statutory violations to the substance of the
environmental menace present on the property. The imminent and
identifiable harm standard requires the court to determine whether an
environmental hazard actually exists and the likelihood that the hazard will
actually impact the public health at some future time.
Courts recognize that any limitation on the power to abandon
necessarily translates into a limitation on the condition in which the trustee
manages the property.48 The aforementioned abandonment standard
therefore sets the minimum level at which any trustee must maintain
environmentally impacted property while the property remains in the
estate.
B. Chapter Seven Trustees
A state environmental agency can pursue the Chapter Seven trustee
under one of two theories. First, the agency may seek compliance with the
Midlantic imminent and identifiable harm standard. Second, the agency
may elect to argue that the trustee clean up the site pursuant to the
mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).49
Chapter Seven trustees must comply with the Midlantic standard
while the property remains in the estate.5° If the property presents an
imminent and identifiable danger to the public, a state agency can request
action on the part of the trustee to address the condition. In response, the
Chapter Seven trustee may elect to eradicate the hazard himself.5"
47. Id.
48. E.g., Lancastle v. State of Tenn. (In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co.), 831 F.2d 118,
122 (6th Cir. 1987).
49. See, e.g., In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). For the
complete text of the relevant portions of section 959(b), see infra p. 13.
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
51. The Fourth Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue of whether the trustee may
consider the expenses she incurs in the abatement of an imminent and identifiable hazard
administrative costs payable by the estate. Most lower courts allow administrative status
to clean-up costs if such costs are (1) reasonable and necessary to preserve the value of
the estate and (2) required by Midlantic. E.g., Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161. Bankruptcy
courts in the Fourth Circuit have classified as administrative those costs incurred by
Chapter Eleven trustees, In re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1984) (reasonable and necessary costs to abate violations are administrative),
and by the state, FCX, 96 B.R. 49 at 55 (costs to abate imminent and identifiable hazard
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In the alternative, the trustee may simply refuse to undertake
abatement actions. This option may leave the interested agency with little
recourse because the law of the Fourth Circuit probably will bar the
agency from obtaining an injunction against the trustee. The court in In
re Doyle Lumber drew a distinction between having the estate pay for the
clean-up and requiring the trustee herself to undertake such activities.52
The court stated in dictum: "Even if it were shown that the facility in its
present condition was an immediate threat to the public safety, which is
not the case, this court has reservations regarding the ability of a Chapter
Seven trustee to perform identification and remediation procedures ...
,,53 The reasoning of the court reflects the generally held notion that the
duties of the Chapter Seven trustee5A are wholly inconsistent with any
are administrative).
52. 137 B.R. 197 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992). The state may also attempt to hold the
trustee personally liable. This action requires that the trustee finance a clean-up with his
own money, not that of the estate. Unfortunately, case law in this area is sparse.
In Wisconsin v. Better Brite Plating, Inc., 466 N.W.2d 239 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991)
modified, 483 N.W.2d 574 (Wis. 1992), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals refused to hold
a trustee personally liable for environmental clean-up absent a showing that the trustee
personally furthered the environmental impact on the estate's property. Id. at 247. The
court found first that, for equitable reasons, exposing the trustee to potentially severe
penalties and clean-up costs would be inappropriate if the trustee had not acted
purposefully. Id. at 246-47. Second, the court detefmined that the threat of personal
liability for mere negligence would drain the pool of trustees willing to serve in
bankruptcies involving toxic waste sites. Id. at 247. These two considerations led the
court to establish that trustees will not be held personally liable for their own negligence.
Id. However, when the trustee's behavior rises to the level of knowing and intentional
disregard for state environmental laws, the court will hold the trustee liable for clean-up
as well as any applicable penalties. Id.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court eventually dismissed the actions against the
trustees on jurisdictional grounds. Wisconsin v. Better Brite Plating, Inc., 483 N.W.2d
574 (Wis. 1992).
For a general discussion of case law in this area, see E. Allan Tiller, Personal
Liability of Trustees and Receivers in Bankruptcy, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 75 (1979).
53. Doyle Lumber, 137 B.R. at 203. But see Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. at 169-70 (court
may order Chapter Seven trustee to take abatement actions if estate possesses sufficient
assets to assure success of actions).
54. The Bankruptcy Code requires the Chapter Seven trustee merely to "collect and
reduce to money the property of the estate... and close such estate as expeditiously as
is compatible with the best interests of the parties in interest . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 704(1)
(1992).
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management functions.55 The task of cleaning up a site is not within the
mandate of the Chapter Seven trustee, and the language of Doyle Lumber
strongly implies that the Fourth Circuit will not require the trustee to
undertake this task.56
If the state's attempts under Midlantic do indeed fail, the agency
may seek compliance under 28 U.S.C. § 959(b). Section 959(b) provides:
[A] trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause
pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property
in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State
in which the property is situated, in the same manner that
the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if in
possession thereof.
57
The Fourth Circuit itself has not yet ruled on the applicability of
section 959(b) to Chapter Seven trustees for environmental clean-up
actions. Other federal courts have not adopted a uniform reading of the
statute. The prevailing view maintains that the mere possession of the
property by the trustee is sufficient to force the trustee to comply with
applicable state law.5" This holds true regardless of whether the
proceeding is a liquidation or a reorganization.59
The minority view, as espoused by the court in In re Microfab,
Inc.,' requires the trustee to actually manage or operate the property
before section 959(b) will impose any obligations on the trustee pursuant
55. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 721 (1992) (permitting Chapter Seven trustee to operate
business of debtor only if such operation is "consistent with the orderly liquidation of the
estate"), with 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (1992) (permitting Chapter Eleven trustee to operate the
debtor's business provided merely that a party in interest requests such action and that the
court does not object).
56. The court's absolution of the trustee for clean-up duties in liquidation leads to a
somewhat odd result. Smith-Douglass requires the property to be cleansed of imminent
and identifiable harms prior to abandonment. Yet, Doyle Lumber suggests that a court
cannot compel the trustee to perform this function. Inevitably, the state may be forced
to appoint a receiver to remediate the site in order to allow the trustee to abandon it.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1992).
58. In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co., 831 F.2d 118, 122 (6th Cir. 1987).
59. E.g., In re Charles Stevens, 68 B.R. 774, 781 (D. Me. 1987) (liquidation); In re
Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984) (reorganization).
60. 105 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
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to state law.61 Although the reasoning employed in Doyle Lumber may
appear to suggest that this minority view is the wiser course in Chapter
Seven cases,62 the weight of authority clearly indicates otherwise. One
must also consider that the court that decided In re Microfab expressly
adopted the reasoning of In re Scott Housing Systems, Inc.63  Scott
Housing represents an extraordinarily unpersuasive precedent in this
respect, because the Scott Housing opinion tacitly approved of the majority
view on this issue.6' Thus, the dicta in Doyle Lumber will most likely
not survive a judicial challenge.
The court in In re Wall Tube & Metal Products Co. 65 noted that
the section 959(b) mandate does not require strict compliance with all state
statutes.6 The Midlantic opinion affords the reviewing court the power
to assess the law's effect on the bankruptcy proceedings and relieve the
estate of compliance in certain instances.67
61. See id. at 168. A bankruptcy court in Virginia nearly reached the related and
threshold question of whether the state law even applies in Chapter Seven cases. See In
re Doyle Lumber, Inc., 137 B.R. 197, 203 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992). Many environmental
regulations define a responsible party as an "owner or operator." See, e.g. VA. CODE.
ANN. § 62.1-44.2 et seq. (Michie 1992); Va. Regs. Reg. 680-13-02 §§ 6.1-6.8 (1992).
This language parallels "manage or operate" as used in section 959. If a court is not
willing to deem the trustee an owner or operator within the state statute, the court may
not even have to reach the section 959 determination.
In Doyle Lumber, a bankruptcy court intimated that the Chapter Seven trustee
may not qualify as an owner or operator under the state's hazardous waste management
regulations absent an order authorizing the trustee to operate the business. This suggests
that the court order may bring the trustee under the operation of both section 959 and the
state law simultaneously and that without the order, neither statute applies. However, the
court later stated that the duties of the Chapter Seven trustee are "inconsistent with
arranging and supervising environmental remediation." Id. at 203. This language implies
that the court may be very reluctant to authorize the Chapter Seven trustee to manage or
operate property where such activity may embroil the trustee in remediation functions.
62. See Doyle Lumber, 137 B.R. at 199.
63. 91 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1988); See Microfab, 105 B.R. at 168.
64. Scott Housing, 91 B.R. at 196. The court in Scott Housing held § 959(b) inapplicable
because the case concerned zoning issues. The court noted that the Supreme Court had
excepted environmental issues in Midlantic and therefore any decision regarding such
issues was inapplicable in the context of zoning. Id.
65. 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
66. Id. at 122-23 n.13.
67. Id.
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C. Chapter Eleven Trustees
68
The duty of the Chapter Eleven trustee is to maintain the activities
of the estate while effectuating a financial reorganization.69  Section
959(b) requires that a trustee acting in such a capacity "shall manage and
operate the property ... according to the requirements of the valid laws
of the State in which the property is situated. 70  Unlike the Chapter
Seven trustee, the Chapter Eleven trustee does actually manage and operate
the property. Thus, there is no question that section 959(b) potentially
subjects Chapter Eleven trustees to a full range of state enforcement
actions.
Federal courts outside the Fourth Circuit have held that agencies
may obtain injunctions to compel the Chapter Eleven trustee to bring the
property into full compliance with all applicable environmental laws.7'
This rule applies regardless of whether the debtor entered into a pre-
petition agreement with the agency.72
The Fourth Circuit has not yet ruled on the duties of a Chapter
Eleven trustee who chooses not to abandon property. In In re
Smith-Douglass, Inc.,73 an abandonment case, the Fourth Circuit implied
that it would adopt a flexible approach to remediation on properties of
68. This section applies generally to debtors in possession as well as Chapter Eleven
trustees. See supra note 7. The discussion will refer to both categories as "Chapter
Eleven trustee" or "trustee" where applicable.
69. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1146 (1992).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1992).
71. E.g., In re Williston Oil Corp., 54 B.R. 10, 11-12 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1984). The Fourth
Circuit has not yet ruled on the duties of Chapter Eleven trustees in regard to property
retained by the estate. If the Fourth Circuit follows the decisions mentioned herein, the
court will permit the Chapter Eleven trustee to retain property in the estate only if the
estate finances full remediation. In the alternative, the estate may abandon the property
and merely pay to abate any imminent and immediate threats. For severely impacted
properties, the trustee may benefit the estate more by simply abandoning the property and
not attempting to rehabilitate it. This result conflicts with the general purpose of a
Chapter Eleven reorganization. See generally Ellen E. Seward, Resolving Conflicts
Between Bankruptcy Law and the State Police Power, 1987 WISC. L. REV. 403, 426-33
(1987) (failure of the courts to establish a unified policy to further the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code). The Fourth Circuit has noted, however, that in a Chapter Eleven
abandonment the court will require stricter compliance with environmental laws if the
estate possesses unencumbered assets. In re Smith-Douglass, Inc., 856 F.2d 12, 17 (4th
Cir. 1988).
72. In re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. 652, 654 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984).
73. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Chapter Eleven debtors.74 The court noted that "where the estate has
unencumbered assets, the bankruptcy court should require stricter
compliance with state environmental law before abandonment is permitted"
by a Chapter Eleven trustee. 75 Under Smith-Douglass, a state agency
should be able to obtain an injunction to compel remediation of any
imminent and immediate hazards. The court may also order full
compliance with all applicable environmental laws provided that the estate
can finance such activities. 76  As always, the automatic stay will not
hinder the state agency in its attempts to compel action on the part of the
Chapter Eleven trustee.77
III. ACTIONS INVOLVING THE ESTATE
If the trustee refuses or is unable to carry out the remediation, a
state agency may undertake clean-up operations as its own statutory
powers permit.78  The Supreme Court's opinion in Ohio v. Kovacs
dictates that when the state incurs costs for effecting an environmental
clean-up on a bankrupt's property, the state converts any clean-up
obligation of the trustee or debtor into a claim against the estate.79 The
claim is akin to an unsecured debt and is dischargeable. 80 The Court's
holding in Kovacs will not impede the state's efforts to obtain a judgment
affixing a value to that claim.8' A court will stay any attempt to enforce
this money judgment against the estate. 82
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Midlantic National
Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection83 has
created an exception to the rather harsh Kovacs rule. In In re Wall Tube
74. Id. at 17.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. In re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. at 654 (citing Penn Terra, Ltd. v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Envt'l Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3rd Cir. 1984)).
78. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:9 (10) (Michie 1992) (authorizing Virginia
State Water Control Board to undertake corrective action with respect to the release of
regulated substance from an underground storage tank or oil from a facility and to seek
recovery for costs incurred from the owner or operator, including an individual or trust).
79. 469 U.S. 274, 278-83 (1985).
80. Id. at 283.
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1992).
82. Id.
83. 474 U.S. 494 (1986), reh'g denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986).
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& Metal Products Co. the Sixth Circuit considered the abandonment
rule of Midlantic and held that any response costs incurred by the state to
bring the estate's property into compliance with federal environmental laws
would constitute an administrative cost.85 Similarly, the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Massachusetts has noted that the state's expenses
may properly be administrative as long as (1) the state's clean-up activities
address maladies described in Midlantic86 and (2) the costs are actual and
necessary to the preservation of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §
503(b)(1)(A) 7
To date, the Fourth Circuit has given this issue only cursory
treatment. In In re Smith-Douglass, Inc.,88 the court merely stated that
"[c]leaning up environmental violations is properly considered an
administrative expense within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)."89
The court did not make clear whether it would adopt the first prong of the
Microfab analysis, i.e., that administrative expense status is limited to
clean-up costs incurred for imminent and identifiable hazards.90 In In re
FCX, Inc.,9' the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina held that the state could only recover as administrative expenses
those costs incurred while ridding the property of maladies falling under
the Midlantic rule.92 Any other expenses could be satisfied through a lien
on the debtor's property. 93 Furthermore, the Smith-Douglass opinion does
not require full compliance with all applicable state laws as the Sixth
Circuit opinion in Wall Tube did. This reasoning suggests that the court
probably will consider any expenses the state incurs beyond what is
84. 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
85. Id. at 123-24.
86. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
87. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 166 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
88. 856 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1988).
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 16.
91. 96 B.R. 49 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
92. Id. at 55 ("[olnly those costs reasonably required to remove the immediate threat will
be given cost of administration status.").
93. Id. But see In re Laurinburg Oil Co., Inc., 49 B.R. 652 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1984).
Both Laurinburg and FCX concerned debtors in possession. In Laurinburg the court
permitted the debtor to recover as an administrative cost all expenses the debtor incurs
during efforts to bring the site into full compliance with applicable environmental laws.
However, Laurinburg was decided prior to Midlantic, that is, prior to the notion that
imminent and identifiable hazards should receive special consideration. Therefore, the
holding in FCX should control generally.
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required by Midlantic administrative costs. Further disbursements will fall
under the Kovacs rule and be converted to unsecured claims.
IV. PENALTIES
State environmental statutes normally provide for the imposition of
administrative penalties on those who violate applicable provisions.
94
The automatic stay will permit the agency to obtain a judgment for such
fines but the stay will not allow enforcement of the judgment.95 The
Bankruptcy Code will not allow the discharge of debts incurred through
the imposition of fines or penalties. Section 523(a) provides:
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt . . . to the extent such debt is for a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a
governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss .... 96
Naturally, the agency's arguments that any fines or penalties are collectible
on an administrative basis will have no merit.' These rules apply
equally to Chapter Eleven and Chapter Seven debtors.98
V. SUMMARY
Under the Fourth Circuit's limited case law, the Bankruptcy
Code provides little hindrance to a state environmental agency in a
Chapter Eleven case. The Code, however, may handicap severely any
94. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.32 (Michie 1992) (authorizing civil penalties up
to $25,000 for each violation of the State Water Control Law).
95. In re Williston Oil Corp., 54 B.R. 10, 12 (Bankr. D. NJ. 1984).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 523(A) (1992). No court has interpreted the term "individual debtor."
The Bankruptcy Code defines "debtor" as a "person or municipality." 11 U.S.C. §
101(12) (1992). The definition of "person" includes any "individual, partnership, and
corporation." 11 U.S.C. at § 101(35). Clearly, section 523(A) should bar corporations
as well as individuals from discharging fines and penalties. See also Matter of Carracino,
53 B.R. 513 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1985) (applying section 523(A) to environmental fines).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1992) (containing list of administrative expenses which
does not include environmental penalties or harms).
98. E.g., Matter of Carracino, 53 B.R. 513 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1985) (fines imposed on
Chapter Eleven debtor); In re Lenz Oil Service, Inc., 65 B.R. 292 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1986)
(fines imposed on Chapter Seven debtor).
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enforcement efforts under a Chapter Seven liquidation.
In a Chapter Eleven case, the presence of a pre-petition
compliance agreement is of little significance. The state most likely can
obtain an injunction to compel full compliance with all applicable
environmental laws, but the extent to which the property must comply
with these laws may depend on the financial health of the estate.
A state may compel a Chapter Seven debtor to perform the
actions prescribed by a pre-petition agreement, not withstanding the
automatic stay. Once a trustee controls the estate and if the debtor has
not previously entered into any agreements with the state, the state
probably will have to undertake clean-up actions itself and then seek
recovery from the estate. In this case, the state may recover as
administrative costs those expenditures used to abate any imminent and
identifiable hazards as defined by the Fourth Circuit. Any other
expenses become unsecured claims and may be discharged later in the
bankruptcy proceedings.
In either case, the law of the Fourth Circuit in this field remains
substantially unsettled. In order to protect their interests, the regulated
community and state agencies alike should be wary of the areas which
require clarification.
